By Cindy Skach
After the cave in of communism, a few thirty nations scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. unusually, the constitutional version they normally selected was once neither the natural parliamentary version present in so much of Western Europe on the time, nor the presidential version of the Americas. particularly, it used to be semi-presidentialism--a infrequent version identified extra more often than not because the "French type." This constitutional version melded components of natural presidentialism with these of natural parliamentarism. particularly, semi-presidentialism mixed a popularly elected head of country with a head of presidency accountable to a legislature.
Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism through new democracies. Drawing on wealthy case stories of 2 of crucial nations for ecu politics within the 20th century--Weimar Germany and the French 5th Republic--Cindy Skach deals the 1st theoretically concentrated, and traditionally grounded, research of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional selection issues, simply because lower than yes stipulations, semi-presidentialism constructions incentives that make democratic consolidation tough or that really give a contribution to democratic cave in. She bargains a brand new concept of constitutional layout, integrating insights from legislations and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach demanding situations either democratic conception and democratic perform. This e-book should be welcomed not just via students and practitioners of constitutional legislation but in addition through these in fields corresponding to comparative politics, ecu politics and background, and foreign and public affairs.
Read Online or Download Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic PDF
Similar constitutional law books
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas
The migration of constitutional principles throughout jurisdictions is among the critical gains of latest constitutional perform. The expanding use of comparative jurisprudence in studying constitutions is one instance of this. during this 2007 publication, best figures within the learn of comparative constitutionalism and comparative constitutional politics from North the US, Europe and Australia talk about the dynamic techniques wherein constitutional structures effect one another.
Economics, Law and Individual Rights
This can be the 1st publication to ascertain person rights from an fiscal standpoint, accumulating jointly top articles during this rising niche and displaying the colourful and increasing scholarship that relates them. parts lined comprise - the consequences of constitutional protections of person rights and freedoms, together with freedom of speech and of the clicking, - the suitable to endure fingers, - the best opposed to unreasonable searches, - the fitting opposed to self-incrimination, - the ideal to trial by way of jury, - the precise opposed to merciless and weird punishment, together with capital punishment.
Understanding the European Constitution: An Introduction to the EU Constitutional Treaty
The eu Union is now coming into an important section because the ratification procedure hurries up and key debates and referenda occur in present and very likely new member states. The Union’s Constitutional treaty is usually forged as both a blueprint for a centralized and protectionist super-state or because the triumph of Anglo-Saxon economics.
Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives
Curiosity in constitutionalism and within the courting between constitutions, nationwide identification, and ethnic, spiritual, and cultural range has soared because the cave in of socialist regimes in japanese Europe and the previous Soviet Union. on account that international struggle II there has additionally been a proliferation of latest constitutions that fluctuate in numerous crucial respects from the yankee structure.
- Sexuality in the Legal Arena
- The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories
- We Must Not Be Afraid to Be Free: Stories of Free Expression in America
- Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law
- Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law
Extra info for Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic
Sample text
Nicholls and E. , German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), pp. 29–46. 22 Jones, German Liberalism, pp. 31–43. 23 See Lothar Albertin, Liberalismus und Demokratie am Anfang der Weimarer Republik: Eine vergleichende Analyse der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei und der Deutschen Volkspartei (Du¨sseldorf: Droste, 1972), which discusses important differences between the DDP and the DVP. 24 Jones, German Liberalism, p. 46; also see Wolfgang Hartenstein, Die Anfa¨nge der Deutschen Volkspartei 1918–1920 (Du¨sseldorf: Droste, 1962), which discusses the party’s development and its ambivalence toward the Republic; on the DVP’s relationship to industrial lobbies, see Lothar Do¨hn, Politik und Interesse: Die Interessenstruktur der Deutschen Volkspartei (Meisenheim: Hain, 1970).
A president is frozen into this scenario for his full term, or until a majority in the legislature can be formed. The president can usually call early elections in an attempt to get a majority, but there is no guarantee that a majority will be formed if the party system is not amenable to majorities or coalitions, and especially if the president has recently victimized the parties. Reinserting semi-presidentialism into a comparative discussion of constitutional types, how does an executive in each type wind up in a situation in which she does not have a legislative majority?
PR systems vary in their degree of proportionality, depending on the mathematical method used to distribute seats, which varies from the very proportional Sainte-Lague¨ method to the least proportional d’Hondt formula. 25 A polity’s choice of electoral system is often a negotiated decision, and 22 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p. 22. See William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), especially his discussion of bargaining through side payments, pp.